Asbestos: When Is Insurer Liability Triggered in California? by Edic, Bill S.
McGeorge Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 3 Article 6 
1-1-1988 
Asbestos: When Is Insurer Liability Triggered in California? 
Bill S. Edic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bill S. Edic, Asbestos: When Is Insurer Liability Triggered in California?, 19 PAC. L. J. 845 (1988). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol19/iss3/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu. 
Comments
Asbestos: When is Insurer Liability
Triggered in California?
California courts are faced with resolving significant amounts of
litigation prompted by claims of asbestos related injuries.' The nature
of these injuries2 presents questions that are being addressed for the
first time in the California courts. 3 Claims of asbestos related injuries
present difficult issues for the courts because there is an extended
latency period 4 between initial exposure to asbestos fibers and man-
ifestation of an asbestos related disease such as abestosis. 5 During
this latency period, which often lasts twenty years or more, 6 the
manufacturer of asbestos products may have contracted with several
1. Telephone interview with Art McGuire, Editor, ASBESTOS LITIGATION REPORTER (Sep-
tember 3, 1987) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal). Approximately 50,000 asbestos related
lawsuits have been filed nationwide. Id. Since asbestos was used extensively in building ships
the majority of claims are filed in those states that have shipyards. Id. While no precise
statistics are available, approximately 25% of all asbestos cases are filed in California courts.
Id. See Note, Insurance Law and Asbestosis - When Is Coverage of a Progressive Disease
Triggered? 58 WAsH. L. REv. 63 n.94 (1982) (25% of all asbestos claims are filed in California);
see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 758, 761, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 880, 882 (1980). Out of 3,000 claims filed against Insurance Co. of North America, 800
claims came from Los Angeles County alone. Id. Potential liability could reach $20 billion.
Id.
2. Asbestosis, mesothelioma (tumor of the membranes surrounding the lungs and lining
the abdominal cavity), and bronchogenic carcinoma (lung cancer) are all related to inhalation
of asbestos dust. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
3. Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523 n.6 (9th Cir.
1985) (review of California law revealed that the California Supreme Court had not addressed
the issues involved in cases of latent disease).
4. Latency period is defined as the seemingly inactive period between exposure of tissue
to an injurious agent and the manifestation of a response. DoRLAwN'S MEDICAL DICTONARY
991 (26th Ed. 1981).
5. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973) (the
court described asbestosis as a progressive, irreversible, fatal change in the lung tissue caused
by exposure to asbestos fibers). See infra note 43 (description of the scarring process).
6. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083 (generally asbestosis takes 10 to 25 or more years to manifest
after initial exposure).
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different insurance carriers. 7 The courts are called on to determine
which of these successive insurers must provide a defense in lawsuits
against the insured manufacturer and, if necessary, indemnify against
any adverse judgments. 8
The California Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of what
triggers insurer liability for damages caused by a latent disease. 9
Nevertheless, analogous situations involving multiple successive in-
surers have been litigated applying California law. 1° Both federal
courts" and California appellate courts have attempted to determine
when insurer liability is triggered.
In attempting to determine a trigger for insurer liability, the federal
courts have developed three distinct theories. 3 Several courts have
employed the exposure theory whereby insurer liability is triggered
by inhalation of asbestos particles.' 4 In contrast, another court applied
the manifestation theory and held that liability is not triggered until
asbestosis becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. 5 Lastly,
7. See e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1213 (6th Cir. 1980) (five different insurance companies provided coverage over a 20 year
period); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (four
different companies provided coverage over a 20 year period).
8. See, e.g., Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases Judicial Council Coordination Proceed-
ig No. 1072, San Francisco Superior Court, 2-3 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter
Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases] (issues include trigger and scope of coverage for asbestos
related injuries).
9. See L.A. Daily Journal, May 15, 1987, at 3, col. 1. In California the state appellate
courts have not rendered a decision as to when latent disease occurs for purposes of triggering
insurer liability; see supra text accompanying note 3.
10.. See infra notes 11, 12, 130-211 and accompanying text (discussion of conflicts involving
multiple successive insurers and issues of latency litigated under California law).
11. See, e.g., Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 521 n.1
(9th Cir. 1985) (diversity action applying substantive law of California).
12. See, e.g., California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
468, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 464 (1983) (progressive damage to swimming pool continued over a
period of time during which two successive insurers provided coverage).
13. See Hancock Laboratories Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1985)
(basic theories are the exposure, manifestation, and triple trigger theories). See infra note 149
(the Hancock court refers to the triple trigger theory as the continuous exposure theory). See also
Levit, Toxic Peril and Products Liability: Current Insurance and Legal Developments, Los
Angeles Daily Journal Reports (March 22, 1985). These theories were developed through
application of state laws. Id. at 5. For this reason the United States Supreme Court has not
granted review. Id. Because insurance contracts are usually governed by state law, other
theories have been and may be developed. Id. at 5-6.
14. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1223
(6th Cir 1980) (coverage triggering bodily injury includes the tissue damage which takes place
after inhalation of asbestos dust). See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text (discussion
of exposure theory). Exposure of the lung tissue to asbestos fibers triggers liability, hence this
concept is known as the exposure theory. Id. at 1217.
15. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (1st
Cir. 1982) modifying 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981) (policy triggered when asbestos related
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one court developed the triple trigger theory and found all insurers
liable to the insured manufacturer if the insurer had a policy in effect
at any time from exposure to asbestos to manifestation of asbestosis. 16
California has yet to adopt a theory to determine when, during
the progression of asbestosis, there is an occurrence which will trigger
insurer liability. 17 In Hancock Laboratories v. Admiral Insurance
Co.'s the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that California
law had to be applied to the diversity action. 19 The Hancock court,
recognizing that the California Supreme Court had not ruled on the
issue of latent disease and multiple insurers, proceeded to make a
determination of how the California Supreme Court would rule.20 In
making this decision, the Hancock court acknowledged, but did not
follow, the case of California Union Insurance Co. v. Landmark
Insurance Co.21 In California Union, the California Court of Appeals
attempted to resolve a question of insurer liability in a latency
situation. 22 The Hancock court determined that the California Union
case did not constitute binding authority2 and reached a conclusion
different from that of the California Appellate Court.24 Neither of
the above cases, however, dealt with asbestosis. More recently, a San
Francisco Superior Court tentative opinion discussed the issues of
insurer liability and asbestosis in a massive consolidation of asbestos
disease became reasonably capable of medical diagnosis). See infra notes 86-109 and accom-
panying text (discussion of manifestation theory). Since actual development of asbestosis is
required to trigger coverage, this theory is labeled the manifestation theory. Id. at 16.
16. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
Inhalation of asbestos, the continuing exposure of the lungs to asbestos lodged in the lung
tissue, and manifestation of asbestosis all trigger coverage. Id. See infra notes 110-35 and
accompanying text (discussion of triple trigger theory). Because insurer liability may be
established by finding any one of three circumstances to exist this theory is often referred to
as the triple trigger theory. See Note, supra note I, at 64 n.10; see also Asbestos Insurance
Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 16 (refers to theory espoused in Keene as the triple trigger).
17. See supra text accompanying note 9 (no California appellate decision on insurance
trigger in asbestosis case).
18. 777 F.2d 520 (9th cir. -1985).
19. Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 521 n.1 (appeal from
a diversity action with the substantive law of California applicable, citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
20. Id. at 523 n.6. The court reviewed California law and discovered that the California
Supreme Court had not addressed a conflict involving multiple successive insurers and extended
latency periods in an asbestos case. Id.
21. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
22. Id. at 466-67, 193 Cal. Rptr. 462-64 (a swimming pool began leaking upon installation
causing progressively worsening damage over a period of approximately eighteen months). See
infra notes 171-96 and accompanying text (discussing California Union).
23. The Hancock court stated that an intermediate state appellate court ruling was not
binding precedent. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 525 n.10.
24. Id. at 525 (court found only one exposure and did not prorate liability).
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litigation known as the Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases.25 Beyond
these cases, the issue of what triggers insurer liability in California
when a latent disease is involved remains unsettled.
California courts will have to determine which, if any, of the three
federal court theories should be applied. In making this determination
the courts should look to general policies of state law for guidance.
California courts recognize the general principle that insurance con-
tracts should be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties
as indicated by the plain meaning of the policy language.2 6 When a
contract is unclear as to when the progression of asbestosis can
trigger an insurance policy, the policy should be interpreted to
promote coverage of the insured. 27
This comment will first provide background information on as-
bestos and related insurance coverage. 28 Next, this comment will
examine the exposure, manifestation, and triple trigger theories ar-
ticulated by the federal courts to determine the extent to which
coverage is promoted. 29 This will be followed by a discussion of cases
applying California law to conflicts involving extended latency. 0
Finally, this comment will propose that the triple trigger theory
should be adopted in California. 31
BACKGROUND
A. Asbestos
Asbestos is a mineral which is mined and can be readily separated
into fibers that can be woven into cloth. 32 These fibers will not burn
or readily conduct heat and are highly resistant to acids. 33 For
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The court adopted a theory resembling the
triple trigger theory. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 43-50.
26. See, e.g., Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 767, 180
Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (1982) (words used in an insurance policy are to be interpreted according
to the plain meaning which a layman would ordinarily attach to them); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 466, 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (1986).
27. See Harris v. Glen Fail Ins. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 699, 701, 493 P.2d 861, 862, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 134, 135 (1972) (any ambiguity or uncertainty to be resolved against the insurer).
28. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 57-135 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 136-224 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 225-49 and accompanying text.
32. See G.L. BAum, TExTBooK oF PuLmoNARY DIsEasas 498-99 (1974) [hereinafter G.L.
BAum]. There are six varieties of asbestos, but they all share basic similarities. Id. See supra
note 8, Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, at 26. Various types of asbestos have been
used interchangeably and in mixtures for years. Id. Medical evidence indicates that each type
of asbestos contributes to the disease processes of asbestosis. Id.
33. See G.L. BAum, supra note 32 at 499.
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centuries these characteristics have made asbestos a very useful sub-
stance for insulation, fireproofing, and other industrial uses.34 The
modern asbestos industry began in the 1870's.35 Approximately twenty
years later, researchers made the first reports of ill effects associated
with asbestos.36 The death in 1906 of an employee who worked in a
carding37 room of an asbestos products manufacturer is considered
to be the first death in modern times proven to be the result of
exposure to asbestos. 38
Asbestosis is an insidious disease 9 that begins with injury to the
lungs shortly after asbestos particles are inhaled. 4° The quality of
near indestructibility that makes asbestos useful to industry is the
same quality that renders asbestos toxic. 41 Particles of asbestos that
are deposited in the lungs cannot be absorbed by the normal defense
mechanisms of the body. 42 Scarring of the lungs occurs as a result
of the efforts of the body to neutralize the asbestos particles. 43 Twenty
years or more usually elapse before a person exposed to harmful
asbestos fibers manifests asbestosis. 4 During the latency period there
are no observable symptoms of the disease. 4
34. See B. CASTLEhiAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEcAL ASPECTS 1 (1984). Both the mineral
and the hazardous qualities of asbestos were known as far back as the time of Christ. Id.
The Romans were aware of the useful properties of asbestos as well as the hazards of working
with asbestos. Id. Slaves who worked with asbestos often were provided with masks to prevent
inhalation of asbestos dust and thereby increase their productive lifespan. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 2. In 1897 a Vienna physician wrotethat there was no doubt that pulmonary
disorders among asbestos weavers and their families was caused by inhalation of asbestos
fibers. Id.
37. Carding is a process of separating fibers and laying them in a web to remove impurities.
Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Insidious disease is defined as progressing with few or no symptoms to indicate its
gravity. STDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 711 (23rd ed. 1976).
40. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1973).
41. See Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 28.
42. Id. (the lungs normal clearance mechanisms are ineffective in removing asbestos
fibers once the fibers are imbedded in the lung tissues).
43. Id. at 27-28. The court described the scarring process:
Fibrosis refers to the formation of fibrous tissue, and is more commonly called scarring.
When associated with an external cut to the skin, fibrosis may be considered a
necessary and helpful form of healing which restores the body to a functional-
albeit altered-state. When associated with the inhalation of asbestos, however,
fibrosis results in the impairment and destruction of the alveolar/capillary gas
exchange units necessary to breathe. As such, and because of the irreversible nature
of the fibrotic process on the lung tissue, fibrosis caused by the inhalation of asbestos
is more appropriately characterized as a form of injury than of healing or repair.
Id.
44. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083. See also G.L. BAum supra note 32, at 502 (onset of symptoms
rarely occurs less than seven to ten years after exposure to asbestos dust).
45. See generally Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083-85 (oft quoted discussion of asbestos related
disease).
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B. Latency and Insurance
After the first proven asbestos related death in 1906, over sixty
years passed before a lawsuit was brought against a manufacturer of
asbestos. 46 In Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp.,47 the court
held that an asbestos manufacturer was liable for the injuries caused
to employees of the manufacturer by exposure to asbestos dust.41
Since the Borel decision there has been a flood of litigation centering
on asbestos related injuries. 49 The extended latency period which is
characteristic of the disease caused by exposure to asbestos, creates
difficulty in the determination of when the disease or injury actually
occurs.50 Nevertheless, when a manufacturer of asbestos products has
several successive insurers the determination of when the disease or
injury occurs becomes critical.5 1 This determination will indicate
which insurer or insurers are liable to defend and possibly indemnify
the insured manufacturer. 52
Each of the manufacturers in the federal cases which gave rise to
the three theories of insurer liability held comprehensive general
liability insurance policies53 that had nearly identical terms.54 The
policies stated (in pertinent part):
[The insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
bodily injury or ... property damage to which this policy applies
because of an occurrence.
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained
46. See Mehaffy, Asbestos Related Lung Disease, 16 FORuM 341, 345 (1980). The first
asbestosis suit was brought in 1968. Id. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 403
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), was the first asbestosis case tried to verdict. Id.
47. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1096.
49. See Mehaffy, supra note 46, at 345 (more than 10,000 suits filed in the seven years
following the Borel decision).
50. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216 (6th Cir. 1981).
51. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (to find the trigger of coverage a determination of when injury occurred must be made).
52. See id. at 1042 (first step in analysis of the insurer's duty is to find when injury
occurred).
53. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 17 (Ist Cir.
1982); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir. 1980).
54. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17 (quoting policy language); Keene, 667 F.2d at 1039
(quoting policy language); Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216 (quoting policy language).
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by any person which occurs during the policy period including death
resulting therefrom.
"Occurrence" means an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions which results, during the policy period, in bodily in-
jury. 5
Additional similarities existed in these federal cases. In each case the
insured was an asbestos products manufacturer with several successive
insurers. 6 From essentially identical fact patterns three distinct the-
ories of insurer liability have emerged.
THEoRIEs OF INSURER LIABILITY
A. Exposure Theory
Exposure to an injury producing agent, such as asbestos, triggers
insurer liability under the exposure theory.-7 The exposure theory was
first described in Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc." The defendant manufacturer, Forty-Eight
Insulations Inc., was faced with huge potential liability due to the
numerous lawsuits filed by people claiming injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos fibers emanating from products manufactured
by the company.59 In addition, Forty-Eight Insulations Inc. had
several successive general liability insurance policies issued by five
different insurance companies over a twenty year period.6 In Forty-
Eight Insulations, the court faced the task of determining which
insurer or combination of insurers was obligated to defend these
lawsuits and pay for any judgments against the insured.61
As developed by the Forty-Eight Insulations court, the exposure
theory was based on medical testimony that every time a person
55. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216; see also Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17;
Keene, 667 F.2d at 1039.
56. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 15; Keene, 667 F.2d at 1038; Forty-Eight Insulations,
633 F.2d at 1217.
57. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1223 ("Bodily Injury" that triggers insurer liability
should be construed to include tissue damage which takes place upon inhalation of asbestos).
58. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). Accord Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d
1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (the court did not rephrase or paraphrase the Sixth Circuit opinion,
but adopted the reasoning and result of Forty-Eight Insulations); Commercial Union Ins. Co.
v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985) (equating exposure to asbestos with
bodily injury is the superior interpretation of the insurance contract).
59. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1213.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1216.
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inhales asbestos fibers, microscopic tissue injury occurs to the lungs.62
Insurance coverage is triggered when this injury occurs. 3 Since each
inhalation of asbestos fibers was held to be an injurious incident,
each inhalation was found to be a separate trigger. 64 Thus, the court
held that any insurer with a policy in effect at the time of any
inhalation of asbestos was required to defend and indemnify the
manufacturer against resulting liability.6 5
Application of the exposure theory as articulated by the Forty-
Eight Insulations court will hold any insurer liable if the insurer
provided coverage at the time of inhalation of asbestos particles. 66
In the case of successive insurers, each insurer providing coverage at
the time of inhalation of asbestos fibers will be liable for a pro rata
share of the obligation to defend or indemnify the manufacturer.
67
This proration formula will only yield liability in proportion to the
years that an insurer actually provides coverage. 6 The formula does
not hold the insurer liable for any period after expiration of the
policy.6 9 Additionally, the manufacturer is liable for any uninsured
period of time.70
62. Id. at 1214, 1217. The court found that medical testimony was not in dispute. The
testimony of the experts stated that injury, in the sense there is tissue damage, occurs shortly
after initial inhalation of asbestos fibers. Id. Cf. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1981) (medical testimony stating injury to the lungs does
not occur simultaneously with inhalation of asbestos dust and may not occur at all).
63. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1223.
64. Id. at 1218. Each additional inhalation of asbestos results in build-up of more scar
tissue, therefore a policy triggering bodily injury occurs whenever asbestos fibers are inhaled.
Id.
65. Id. at 1224-25. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546
(lth Cir. 1985). The court defended the exposure theory against medical testimony showing
that not every exposure leads to asbestosis by stating:
We believe that the exposure theory is more accurately analyzed as positing not that
each inhalation of asbestos fibers results in "bodily injury," but rather that every
asbestos-related injury results from inhalation of asbestos fibers. Because such inhalation
can occur only upon exposure to asbestos, and because it is impossible practically to
determine the point at which the fibers actually imbed themselves in the victim's
lungs, to equate exposure to asbestos with "bodily injury" is the "superior inter-
pretation of the contract provisions."
Id.
66. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1218.
67. Id. at 1224. Liability is calculated by reference to the specific facts applicable to each
insurer. Id. The proportionate share of an individual insurer is calculated by first determining
the number of years the worker inhaled asbestos dust and then dividing the years of exposure
into the number of years a particular insurer provided coverage. Id. This calculation will yield
the pro rata share of the obligation of an insurer to defend or indemnify the insured. Id.
68. Id. at 1224. Under the exposure theory, insurer liability is not joint and several, but
rather, is individual and proportionate. Id. at 1225.
69. Id. at 1224-25. For example,. ... if insurer A provided 3 years of coverage, insurer
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In Forty-Eight Insulations, the defendant manufacturer urged a
modification of the proration formula. 71 Specifically, the defendant
argued that an insurer should be liable for the years an insurer had
a policy in effect as well as for subsequent years prior to the
manifestation of the disease.72 This modification sought to create
different obligations on insurers who provided identical coverage for
the same length of time.7 3 These different obligations would not be
based on years of exposure as the exposure theory requires, but
rather on the happenstance of when an insurer provided coverage. 74
Among successive insurers, those who were the first to provide
coverage to the manufacturer would be liable not only for the period
of time the policy was in effect, but also for the period of time after
the policy expired before manifestation of asbestosis. 75 The last
insurer to provide coverage before asbestosis manifested would be
liable only for the time the insurance policy was in effect. 76 Even if
the first insurer and the last insurer had policies in effect for the
same length of time, each insurer would be subject to different
obligations .7
In Forty-Eight Insulations, the court rejected the proposed formula
as creating an anomalous result.78 The court explained that the
exposure theory triggered liability by finding inhalation of asbestos
particles to be an injury covered by the current policy. 79 Liability
was based on finding an injury rather than on the position of an
insurer in a chain of successive insurers. 0 The Forty-Eight Insulations
B an additional 3 years, and the manufacturer was uninsured for the remaining 3 years,
liability would be allocated at 1/3 for each of the three concerns." Id.
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Id. at 1226.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. If three insurance companies each provided three years of coverage over a nine
year period of exposure, under the proposed formula of Forty-Eight Insulations the first
insurer would be liable for the first three years plus the remaining six years while the disease
progressed. Id. The second insurer would be liable for three years plus the following three
years. Id. The final insurer would be liable only for the final three years. Thus liability would
be apportioned 9/18 for the first insurer, 6/18 for the second insurer, and 3/18 for the third
insurer. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1226 (the proposed formula would place different obligations on insurers who
are in the same position).
77. Id. Thus, insurer liability would turn on the random factor of when an insurer
provided coverage in relation to when other insurers in the chain of successive insurers provided
coverage. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1218.
80. Id.
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court also noted that liability could be limited or eliminated if an
insurer could prove that no exposure took place during the years
that the insurer provided coverage.8" The court explained that there
can be no liability for the insurer when there is no exposure to
asbestos, because without exposure there is no injury.82
The exposure theory solves the difficulties associated with an
extended latency period by excluding the latency period from the
definition of a bodily injury. The compensable bodily injury occurs
when the asbestos particles are deposited in the lungs.83 Under this
view of asbestosis, injury is contemporaneous with exposure. In
effect, no period of latency exists. Although the person seeking
compensation for an asbestos related disease cannot bring a claim
until asbestosis manifests, the disease itself is not the injury which
triggers insurer liability. 4 Rather, exposure to the injury-causing
asbestos particles triggers liability. 5
B. Manifestation Theory
The manifestation theory, as discussed by the court in Eagle-Picher
Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance,8 6 triggers insurer liability
when asbestosis becomes clinically evident.8 7 The decision of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals focuses on the language of the insurance
policy.88 The Eagle- Picher court found that the policy language made
81. Id. at 1225. The court recognizes that the burden to prove coverage is normally on
the insured. See id. at 1225 n.27. Nevertheless, the court also acknowledged that because of
the extended latency involved in asbestosis, records of when the products of a particular
manufacturer were used will be vague or non-existent. Id. The court determined that the fair
procedure was to presumptively view each manufacturer as being liable for each of the years
in which a worker was exposed to asbestos and to place the burden on the insurer to show
that the products of the insured were not or could not have been involved during any particular
period of coverage. Id.
82. Id. at 1225. The court gives an example: if an insurer could prove that an effective
respirator was used during the time a person was in an environment containing asbestos dust
there would be no injury causing exposure and therefore no insurer liability. Id. See also
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding the insurer
not liable for any period when there was no exposure to asbestos manufactured by the insured).
83. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1222.
84. Id. at 1222-23 (the court found nothing in the policy requiring a plaintiff's underlying
cause of action against a manufacturer of abestos products to accrue within the policy period).
The manufacturer paid for protection from liability resulting from bodily injury. It makes no
difference when bodily injury becomes compensable. Id. at 1223.
85. Id.
86. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), modifying 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981).
87. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 25 (disease becomes clinically evident when the disease
becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis).
88. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 17-18 (the district court found that the insurance policy
language was plain and clear and therefore no extrinsic evidence tending to prove the intent
of the parties was admitted).
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a clear distinction between the event causing the injury and the injury
itself.5 9 According to the policy the resulting injury, and not the
injury-causing occurrence such as exposure to asbestos particles,
triggered coverage.90 Thus, the exposure to asbestos particles was not
the triggering event. Rather, the manifestation of asbestosis during
the policy period triggered insurer liability.91 The court acknowledged
as fact that injury to the lungs, even microscopic injury, does not
occur simultaneously with inhalation of asbestos dust and may not
occur at all. 92 According to the court, since injury is not a certain
consequence of exposure to asbestos dust, exposure to asbestos dust
does not trigger coverage under the policy. 93
The Eagle-Picher court held that the common, ordinary meaning
of the policy language dictated application of the manifestation
theory. 94 The court determined the plain meaning of injury to be,
"hurt, damage, or loss sustained.' '95 Using this definition of injury,
the court examined expert testimony which revealed that over ninety
percent of all people living in cities have some asbestos related
scarring. 96 Despite the asbestos related scarring, the court found that
no member of this ninety percent would classify themself as being
sick or injured as those terms are commonly understood. 97 Not until
there is scarring sufficient to impair a person's sense of well-being
or to allow a medical determination that onset of asbestosis was
inevitable, would a person be considered injured or diseased. 98
Continuing to discuss the insurance policy, the court also noted
that the policy language differentiated between the term disease and
the term injury. 9 The court stated that asbestosis is usually considered
89. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19-21. See supra text accompanying note 55 (insurance
policy language).
90. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19.
91. Id. (holding that the policy language does not support the exposure theory).
92. Id. But see supra text accompanying note 62 (exposure leads to injury). Cf. Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco. Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985). The court found that
the time between exposure to asbestos and the resulting injury and the likelihood of injury to
be irrelevant to application of the exposure theory. Id.
93. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 19 n.4. The Eagle-Picher court was applying Ohio law to the case at hand, and
to that end noted that the Ohio courts had relied on WEBSTER'S THID Naw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1966 ed.), to determine the plain meaning of language in insurance policies. Id.
96. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court stated that if the terms are to have any distinct meaning bodily injury
is most easily thought of as an injury caused by some external violence or impact whereas
disease is the impairment of the normal state of a living animal. Id. (no clearer distinction
was made in the decision).
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a disease and not a bodily injury.'0° Presuming that every disease is
preceded by sub-clinical changes in the body, the court held that the
plain meaning of disease would be subverted if the court were to
find that these changes constituted the occurrence of a disease.' 0' The
subversion of the plain meaning of disease is particularly apparent
in the case of asbestosis because the sub-clinical changes, 02 micro-
scopic scarrinkof the lungs upon exposure to asbestos dust, do not
necessarily lead to asbestosis.'0 3
The court also clarified the determination of the date of manifes-
tation that triggers coverage. 04 The plain meaning of the policy
language required only that bodily injury come into existence during
the policy period in order to trigger coverage. 05 Asbestosis need not
be diagnosed during the policy period to trigger coverage. 06 For the
purpose of triggering insurer liability, a disease manifests when
asbestosis becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.?° Thus,
only an insurer with a policy in effect when asbestosis manifests is
liable to defend and, if necessary, indemnify the insured. 08
100. Id. WEBXSmR's TmnD NEvw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY defined asbestosis as a form of
pneumocioniosis. Id. The court found that pneumocioniosis was defined as a disease of the
lungs. Id.
101. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19-20. Again the court relied on WEaSTER's and defined
disease as an impairment of the normal state of a living animal or any of its components that
interrupts or modifies the performance of a vital function. Id.
102. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 19-20 (referring to the initial injury to the lungs upon
inhalation of asbestos as sub-clinical injury).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 24. The district court that heard Eagle-Picher held that the date of diagnosis
of asbestosis or death triggers coverage under the insurance policy. Eagle-Picher Indus. v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 115, 118 (D. Mass. 1981).
105. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 24.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. This theory has been criticized because application of the manifestation theory
may render coverage illusory. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034,
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court observed that insurance companies ceased providing adequate
coverage for asbestos injuries when it became known that inhalation of asbestos fibers could
lead to disease. Id. at 1045. Companies that produced asbestos products are still liable for
diseases that manifest due to past exposure to asbestos. Id. at 1045-46. Even though the
asbestos products manufacturer had insurance during the periods of exposure, none of the
companies are liable under the manifestation theory if the policy expires before asbestosis
manifests. Id. See infra notes 110-35 and accompanying text (discussion of Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and the manifestation
theory).
Eagle-Picher was not insured for liability resulting from exposure to asbestos prior to 1968.
Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 16. Under this set of facts, the manifestation theory does promote
coverage. If the exposure theory had been employed Eagle-Picher would have been liable for
its pro rata share of the cost of defense and indemnification arising out of injuries caused by
exposure to asbestos prior to 1968. Under the manifestation theory, Eagle-Picher will not have
to carry any portion of the liability for the cases that manifest after Eagle-Picher bought
insurance.
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The holding of the Eagle-Picher court results in a potential reduc-
tion in the number of policies which can be triggered, since a specific
point in time can be established when the triggering disease occurred.
Insurers that provided coverage during exposure to asbestos, or
during the interim between exposure to asbestos and manifestation
of asbestosis, would not be liable. Only the insurer with a policy in
effect at the time the disease becomes reasonably capable of diagnosis
will be liable to the manufacturer. 10 9
C. Triple Trigger Theory
In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America"0 the
court developed a theory of insurer liability under which all insurers
that provide coverage at any time from initial asbestos exposure to
manifestation of asbestosis would be liable to the insured."' This
theory was grounded on the conclusion that when a manufacturer
purchases a general liability insurance policy the manufacturer is in
essence purchasing security.12 For the price of a premium" 3 the
manufacturer expects to be secure against all losses covered by the
policy. Consequently, any interpretation of the policy must be con-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured." 4 Finding that
the insurance policy language did not clearly dictate the proper theory
of triggering insurer liability, the Keene court examined both the
exposure theory and manifestation theory to determine which best
protected the reasonable expectations of the insured.1"5
In examining the exposure theory, the Keene court determined that
if exposure to asbestos was the injury that triggered liability, then
the subsequent development of asbestosis would be merely a conse-
quence of that injury." 6 Manifestation of asbestosis would not be an
injury and therefore could not trigger coverage." 7 The court found
109. Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 25.
110. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
111. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047.
112. Id. at 1041. By issuing a policy, the insurer agrees to assume the risk of the liability
of the insured. Id. The heart of the transaction is the purchase of security. Id.
113. Premium is the price for insurance protection for a specified period of exposure.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1063 (5th ed. 1979).
114. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041 (the court held in discerning the principles embodied in the
insurance policy the guide must be the reasonable expectations of Keene).
115. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042-47. The court found that the terms "bodily injury," "sickness,"
and "disease" are not precise enough, standing alone, to identify when coverage is triggered.
Id. at 1043.
116. Id. at 1044.
117. Id.
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that by purchasing insurance the Keene Corporation reasonably ex-
pected to be covered for latent injuries that, at the time the policy
was purchased, were unknown and unknowable to Keene Corpora-
tion. 118 If manifestation of asbestosis did not trigger coverage, the
reasonable expectations of the Keene Corporation would not be
realized. 19 The court held that manifestation must trigger coverage
in order to preserve the reasonable expectations of the parties and
to uphold the purpose of the policy. 20 Since manifestation must
necessarily be a trigger of coverage, the court rejected the exposure
theory.12 '
When examining the manifestation theory, the Keene court consid-
ered whether the expectations of the insured would be fulfilled if
manifestation was the sole trigger of insurer liability.'2 The court
acknowledged that Keene Corporation could reasonably expect to be
covered for injuries that the corporation was not aware of prior to
purchasing general liability insurance. 23 Since asbestosis has an ex-
tended latency period, insurers can predict with some degree of
certainty who will manifest the disease. 24 An increasing number of
claims based on asbestos-related injuries alert insurers to the fact
that persons employed in the manufacture of asbestos products are
prone to developing abestosis after some length of time. 25 An insurer
of an asbestos products manufacturer can frustrate the expectations
of the insured by terminating the policy or simply allowing the policy
to expire and refusing to issue any future coverage when asbestosis
118. Id.
119. Id. Keene could reasonably expect coverage for a disease that manifested during the
policy period of the insurer since the policy claims to provide coverage for all injuries occurring
during the policy period. Id. See Note, supra note 1, at 74 (discussing concerns of court to
protect the reasonable expectations of Keene).
120. Keene Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1034, 1044.
121. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1045. The manifestation of asbestosis must constitute an injury
under the policy and as such any theory characterizing exposure as a discrete injury must be
rejected. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The purpose of an insurance contract is defeated if the insured has to bear risk
of disease that is latent at the time policy is purchased. Id.
124. Id. at 1046. Incidences of asbestosis are possible to predict because past occurrences
were assumed to have set in motion injurious processes for which Keene could be held liable.
Id. Example: Victim A is exposed to asbestos dust in 1960. Victim B is exposed to the same
conditions in 1970. A manifests asbestosis in 1980, 20 years after initial exposure. The
manufacturer is held liable. The insurer now knows that exposure to certain conditions can
result in liability. B was exposed to the same certain conditions. The insurer can now make a
prediction with some certainty that 10 years in the future B will manifest a disease for which
the manufacturer will be liable.
125. Id.
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is likely to manifest.1 26 The manufacturer will still be liable while the
insurer may be able to escape liability solely because the latency
period gave the insurer an opportunity to terminate coverage.'2 Thus,
application of the manifestation theory would deprive the insured of
the protection purchased as the insurer could terminate coverage
under these circumstances. 2 8 Therefore, the Keene court rejected the
manifestation theory. 29
Having found that neither the exposure theory nor the manifes-
tation theory protected the expectations of the insured, the Keene
court looked for a definition of bodily injury that would provide the
correct trigger of insurer liability.' 30 According to the Keene court,
bodily injury means any part of a single injurious process.' 3' Expo-
sure, exposure in residence, 132 and manifestation must therefore all
trigger coverage in order to protect the expectations of the insured
under the policy. 133 By defining injury in this manner, the court
provided the broadest possible coverage to the insured. All insurers
who provided coverage to a manufacturer of asbestos products at
any time from the moment a person was first exposed to asbestos
fibers until asbestosis manifests, would have a duty to defend and
possibly indemnify the insured manufacturer. 34 Only by proving that
no inhalation of asbestos fibers occurred before or during the policy
period can an insurer avoid liability. 35
126. See id. at 1045 n.21. In 1976 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company began using large
deductibles and administrative fees for dealing with asbestos claims. Id.
127. Id. at 1046.
128. Id. (citing Snapp v. State Farm, Fire, & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1962)). The court declared that the theory the court developed was consistent with
the law concerning insurance coverage for losses that begin when an insurance policy is in
effect, but continues to develop after coverage expires. Id. Snapp involved an insurance policy
which provided coverage against loss due to land slippage. Snapp, 206 Cal. App. 2d at 831,
24 Cal. Rptr. at 46. The land began moving during the policy period and continued to do so
after the policy expired. Id. The Snapp court held the insurance company liable to the full
extent of the policy for all damages caused by the land slippage from the time the movement
started until the ground stabilized, even that damage occurring after the expiration of the
policy. Id. at 833, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
129. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1046.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1046-47.
132. Id. at 1042 (the court uses the phrase exposure in residence to refer to the period of
time after inhalation of asbestos when asbestos particles are trapped in the lungs and the
disease is developing).
133. Id. at 1046.
134. See id. at 1047. Each insurer is liable in full to the insured subject to provisions in
the policy that govern allocation of liability when more than one policy covers injury. Id. at
1050.
135. Id. at 1052.
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III. CALIFORNlA LAW
A. Federal Courts and California Law
The California Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the
trigger of insurance coverage in asbestos related cases. 116 Despite this
lack of precedent, the Ninth Circuit, when confronted with disputes
over the trigger of insurance coverage arising from extended latency
periods, has, in some cases, determined that California law gov-
erned. 37 With no precedent from the California Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit made a prediction as to how the California Supreme
Court would rule. 38
Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Insurance Co.'39 was an
appeal from a diversity action involving two successive insurers of a
manufacturer. 40 The Ninth Circuit found that California law must
be applied to resolve the dispute.' 4' The first insurer, Admiral Insur-
ance Company, provided coverage when an infected porcine aortic
heart valve 42 manufactured by Hancock Laboratories was implanted
in a heart patient. 143 Six months later the infected valve had so
deteriorated that a second operation was required to replace the
diseased valve.' 44 At the time of the second operation Hancock
Laboratories had a different insurance carrier, Mutual Fire, Marine,
136. See supra text accompanying note 9 (stating that California appellate courts have not
reviewed a latent disease case).
137. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (diversity action with substantive law of California
applicable); Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.
1985) (diversity action with substantive law of California applicable).
138. See, e.g., L.A. Daily Journal, May 18, 1987, at 12, col. 1. United States District
Court Judge William Orrick presided over Clemco Industries v. Commercial Union Insurance
Company, 665 F. Supp 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987), and determined that California law applied to
the case. Id. at 818. Clemco Industries is a California manufacturer of protective equipment
used when engaged in sandblasting. Id. at 817. The equipment manufactured by Clemco
Industries is blamed in part for causing silicosis in people employed as sandblasters. Id. Silicosis
is a lung disease caused by exposure to silica dust. Id. at 821-22. Judge Orrick had to decide
when silicosis occurred in order to determine insurer liability. Id. at 821. Recognizing that the
California courts have not determined when bodily injury occurs in a latent disease Judge
Orrick took his best "Erie guess" as to how the California Supreme Court would rule on this
issue. Id. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
139. 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985).
140. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 521 n.l.
141. Id.
142. A porcine aortic heart valve is a valve taken from the heart of a pig, treated, and
used as a replacement valve in humans. Id. at 521 n.2.
143. Id. at 521-22.
144. Id. at 522.
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and Inland Insurance Company. 45 The Hancock court had to deter-
mine the trigger of insurer liability under the policies in order to
decide which insurer was obligated to provide the defense for Han-
cock Laboratories in the resulting lawsuit. 46
The Hancock court held that the infectious disease that started
with the implantation of the contaminated heart valve was similar to
a progressive disease taking a substantial length of time to manifest. 147
The court likened exposure to the infected heart valve and subsequent
progressive growth of bacteria to the inhalation of asbestos and the
subsequent progressive tissue damage. 48 Using this analogy the Han-
cock court examined the basic theories of exposure, manifestation,
and triple trigger 49 that arose from litigation focusing on asbestos
related disease. 50
The Hancock court found that promotion of coverage for the
insured, and the ability of the insurer to determine liability, were
concerns to be considered when examining the theories of liability.'
The Hancock court held that the triple trigger theory articulated in
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America'5 2 did not
meet these concerns. 53 The court in Hancock found that the triple
trigger theory was developed because the Keene court had difficulty
determining when injuries resulting from inhalation of asbestos oc-
curred.- 4 No specific trigger of insurer liability could be determined
because no specific moment of injury could be found. 15 Therefore,
according to the Hancock court, the triple trigger theory was devel-
oped because, by triggering an insurance policy at any time from
asbestos exposure to manifestation of asbestosis, the need to deter-
mine when injury occurs is eliminated. 56 The Hancock court, how-
ever, stressed the importance of ascertaining a specific point at which
145. Id. at 521.
146. Id. at 523. Mutual agreed, under a reservation of rights, to provide the defense for
Hancock. Id. at 522. The defense cost $264,416.96 for three days of trial ending in settlement
costing an additional $150,000. Id.
147. Id. at 524.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 523. The court refers to the theory espoused in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co.
of North America, 662 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), as the continuous exposure theory. Id.
150. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 57-135 (discussion of the three theories).
151. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 524.
152. 667 F.2d 1034.
153. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 524.
154. Id. at 524. The court states that the basic reasoning in Keene was a perceived difficulty
in determining medically how or when injury occurs. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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liability is triggered. 157 Since the Hancock court felt constrained to
establish a single trigger of insurer liability, the court rejected the
triple trigger theory.""
After rejecting the triple trigger theory developed by the Keene
court, the Hancock court examined the manifestation theory articu-
lated in Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.'59
Under the manifestation theory only actual occurrence of asbestosis
triggers insurer liability. 160 Under this theory, however, the Hancock
court found that coverage could become illusory.' 6' Insurers could
terminate coverage and as a result persons already exposed to asbestos
dust may have only an uninsured manufacturer to look to for
compensation when asbestosis develops.1 62 Since the requirement that
an interpretation of insurance contracts should promote coverage
would not be met, the court found that the California Supreme
Court would reject the manifestation theory. 63
Having rejected the manifestation theory and the triple trigger
theory, the Hancock court concluded that the California Supreme
Court would adopt the exposure theory' 64 as expressed by the court
in Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions. 65 The Hancock court held that a court would have no difficulty
determining when a person was exposed to an injury-producing
agent.1e The exposure theory enables the court to find a single trigger
of an insurance policy, thereby allowing an insurer to determine
liability. 67 Additionally, application of the exposure theory satisfied
the concern of the court for promoting coverage. 6
B. California Cases
Although the Ninth Circuit employed the exposure theory devel-
oped in a federal asbestos case to predict California law, no Cali-
157. Id.
158. Id. The court found that, unlike the exposure theory, the theory applied in Keene
would not allow insurers to determine their liabilities. Id.
159. Id. at 524-25. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25
(1st Cir. 1982). See supra, notes 86-109 and accompanying text (discussion of manifestation
theory).
160. See Eagle-Picher, 682 F.2d at 25.
161. See Hancock, 777 F.2d at 524.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 524-25.
164. The California Supreme Court would probably find the reasoning and result of Forty-
Eight Insulations to be correct. Id. at 525.
165. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying notes 57-85 (discussion
of exposure theory).
166. Hancock, 777 F.2d at 524.
167. Id.
168. Id.
862
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fornia appellate court has reviewed any case concerning asbestosis
and the trigger of insurer liability. 169 Cases involving extended delays
between an act and the resulting injury, however, have been re-
viewed.1 70 The court of appeal in California Union Insurance Co. v.
Landmark Insurance Co. 171 examined insurer liability in a latency
situation. The plaintiff, California Union Insurance Company (Un-
ion), brought a declaratory relief action against defendant, Landmark
Insurance Co. (Landmark), to determine their respective obligations
to a claimant who had suffered property damage from a leaky
swimming pool. 172 The pool leaked for eighteen months during which
time the Landmark policy expired and the policy issued by Union
became effective. 73 In distinguishing several other cases' 74 the Cali-
fornia Union court described the damage to the pool as involving
not merely a delay between a wrongful act and some resultant
damage, but as involving a continuous active force causing progres-
sively worsening damage. 75 The damage began with the installation
of the pool and grew progressively worse over the eighteen month
period. 76 The court found this progressive damage, which began
when one policy was in effect and continued after the second insurer
began to provide coverage, presented a question that had been
addressed in the federal cases involving the progression of asbesto-
sis. 177 Both asbestosis and the leaking pool involve an initial exposure
to a damage producing agent and in each case the damage worsens
over a period of time before the injury becomes manifest. 78 Accord-
ing to the California Union court, there was little to distinguish the
169. Review of California Appellate cases revealed no appeal from decision of trigger of
insurer liability in asbestosis case. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., Remmer v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956)
(landowner engaged in extensive landscaping which caused landslide five years later); Tijsseling
v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976)
(discovered encroachment on property "some years" after negligent misrepresentation).
171. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
172. Id. at 464, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
173. Id. at 466-67, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 462-64.
174. Employer Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Group, 109 Cal. App. 3d 462, 167
Cal. Rptr. 296 (1980); Maples v. Aetna Casualty, 83 Cal. App. 3d 641, 148 Cal. Rptr. 80
(1978); Remmer v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84 (1956); Tijsseling v. General
Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976).
175. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470-73, 193
Cal. Rptr. 461, 465-67 (1983).
176. Id. at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467.
177. Id. at 477-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
178. See generally id. at 476-78. The court describes the damage involved in the leaking
pool as involving, "continuous, progressive, and deteriorating damage." Id. at 476. The court
then addresses the issues raised by such damage by stating that the same issues had been
analyzed in Forty- Eight Insulations and Keene. Id. at 477-78.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
issues raised by the leaking swimming pool and the asbestos cases of
Forty-Eight Insulations and Keene. 179
In California Union the court held that from the time the pool
was installed, until there was a discovery that the pool was leaking
and causing property damage, there was a continuous destructive
force at work. 80 The court held that the progressive damage consti-
tuted one occurrence.' 8' This occurrence was set in motion when the
Landmark policy was in effect and continued after the policy expired.
The court held that the liability of an insurer for a continuing event
that becomes apparent during a policy period is not limited by the
expiration of the policy. 82 The California Union court held that
Landmark was liable for damage arising from the leaking pool even
after expiration of the Landmark policy.'
Acknowledging that the destructive force was already in motion
when the Union insurance policy took effect, the court explored the
potential liability of the Union Insurance Company. 84 The California
Union court found that the question of successive insurer liability
had been addressed by the federal courts. 85 The court examined the
theories expressed in Forty-Eight Insulations and Keene.18 6 The Cal-
ifornia Union court stated that under the exposure theory as expressed
in Forty-Eight Insulations, every insurer providing coverage at any
time, from the moment a person was first exposed to asbestos to the
179. Id. at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471. The court stated:
We are fully mindful of the fact that Forty-Eight Insulations and Keene are products
liability cases. But, as in the case at bench, the policies cover single accident/
occurrence, continuing damage claims. Additionally, the policies involved are ones
of general comprehensive liability, and, in our view, any distinction is more imaginary
than real.
Id.
180. Id. at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
181. Id. at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468. Quoting policy language the court defined "one
occurrence"; ". .. all bodily injury and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one
occurrence." Id. at 474, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
182. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 475, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469 (citing Snapp
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962), as
standing for the proposition that the liability of an insurer for a continuing event is not
terminated by the expiration of the policy).
183. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70 (Landmark is
liable even though policy purported to limit coverage to within the policy period).
184. Id. at 476-77, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
185. Id. at 477-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 469-71 (court refers to Forty-Eight Insulations and
Keene).
186. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 58-82 (discussion of Forty-Eight Insula.
tions); see supra notes 110-35 (discussion of Keene).
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time the disease was diagnosed, was jointly and severally liable. 8 7
The California Union court found that the Keene decision also
imposed joint and several liability on all insurers who provided
coverage at any time from initial exposure to asbestos through to
manifestation of asbestosis.15 Having determined that the present
case contained the same fundamental issues present in Forty-Eight
Insulations and Keene, the California Union court held both Union
and Landmark jointly and severally liable.1 89
The brief expression of the exposure theory by the court in
California Union is not in accord with the theory as developed in
Forty-Eight Insulations.9 ' In Forty-Eight Insulations the court ex-
pressly stated that liability among successive insurers was not joint
and several.' 9' Application of the exposure theory triggered only those
policies that were in effect when a person inhaled asbestos fibers 92
and liability was prorated among the insurers. 93 Joint and several
liability is not part of the exposure theory developed in Forty-Eight
Insulations.194 Rather, by finding joint and several liabilty, the deci-
sion of the California Union court more closely approximated the
triple trigger theory.' 95 By finding that the damage was a process
rather than a discrete event the California Union court articulated
the same reasoning as the Keene court when applying the triple
trigger theory. 96 A policy triggering event occurred at all times during
the damaging process.
Although California Union attempted to apply the federal theories
of insurer liability in a situation of latent injury, direct questions of
the trigger of insurer liability in an asbestos case have yet to reach
the California Court of Appeals. 197 The first case likely to be reviewed
at the appellate level is the Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,98
187. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 477-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470. But see infra
notes 190-94 and accompanying text (liability is not joint and several under the exposure
theory); see Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 n.10 (stating
that California Union incorrectly applied holding of Forty-Eight Insulations).
188. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 477-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
189. Id. at 478, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 57-85 (discussion of exposure theory).
191. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th
Cir. 1980) (allocating cost of indemnification).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 110-35 (discussion of the triple trigger theory).
196. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(bodily injury inolved in asbestosis is a process).
197. See supra text accompanying note 169.
198. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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presently being litigated in the San Francisco Superior Court. The
Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases are a consolidation of several
lawsuits between manufacturers of asbestos products and the various
companies that provided general liability coverage to these manufac-
turers. 199 Proceedings in this case have continued for more than two
years and are not completed. 200 Nevertheless, the superior court has
issued a tentative decision regarding the trigger of insurer liability. 201
According to the San Francisco Superior Court, the language in
the insurance policies purchased by the asbestos manufacturers was
clear and unambiguous. 20 2 The court found that the language of the
policy required that every insurance policy in effect at any time from
first exposure to asbestos until the date of death, was triggered. 203
Each insurer was held independently liable to respond in full to
claims against the insured.20 In reaching this conclusion, the court
held that the insurance policies involved in the consolidated asbestos
case were triggered by bodily injury.2°s The court found the bodily
injury involved in asbestosis to be a continuous process. 206 According
to the court, bodily injury occurred shortly after inhalation of
asbestos dust, continued during the latency period even without
further exposure, and continued to occur past manifestation until
death.207
In keeping with the finding that injury was a continuing process,
the superior court held that the plain policy language did not indicate
that manifestation was to be the sole trigger.20 Therefore, the man-
199. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 1. This case is a consolidaton
of the following suits: Armstrong v. Aetna, Los Angeles Superior Court No. C 315367;
Fireman's Fund v. Fibreboard, San Francisco Superior Court No. 753885; GAF v. INA, Los
Angeles Superior Court No. 286217; Nicolet v. INA, Los Angeles Superior Court No. C
398943. Id. at 1. See Levit, Insurance Law, UNDERWRITER'S REP., 14 (June 11, 1987) (this
consolidated action is a dispute between insurers and the insured; no person injured by asbestos
is a party to the lawsuit).
200. See Levit, supra note 199, at 14 "And the trial is a long way from over, despite [the]
100-page tentative decision . . . ." Id.
201. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8.
202. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 21 (meaning is unambiguous
when policy language is examined by itself).
203. Id. at 43 (any policy coming into effect after date of death or date of claim, whichever
is first, is not triggered).
204. Id. at 61-62 (insurer must pay all sums for which insured is liable).
205. Id. at 21 (pertinent language in policy requires bodily injury to trigger liability).
206. Id. at 29-30 (process is the inhalation of abestos fibers, the reaction of the lungs, the
resulting progressive scarring).
207. Id. at 30.
208. Id. at 45 (the plain language of the insurance policy does not mention manifestation
or indicate that manifestation was to be the sole criterion).
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ifestation theory was expressly rejected by the court.2°9 Even though
a claim for compensation would not accrue until the injured person
became aware of the injury, the court found that this did not mean
that an injury triggering coverage had not already occurred. 210 The
San Francisco Superior Court found that the manufacturer paid for
protection from liability resulting from bodily injury.211 Thus, the
manufacturer should be covered even if the bodily injury did not
become compensable until after the policy expired. 21 2
Having dispensed with the manifestation theory, the court pro-
ceeded to dismiss the exposure theory.2 3 The superior court found
that bodily injury occurred nearly simultaneously with exposure to
asbestos and that new and additional bodily injury continued to
occur even when exposure ceased. 2 4 This finding prevented the court
from making any distinction between an injury occurring shortly
after inhalation of asbestos, and an injury which continued to occur
in the tissues of the lung after exposure ceased. 215 Moreover, the
superior court stated that the Ninth Circuit cases which tried to
determine California law, all of which adopted the exposure theory,
were unpersuasive because of distinguishing elements in each partic-
ular case. 216 Therefore, the San Francisco Superior Court rejected
the exposure theory.217
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id. at 46-47 (bodily injury occurs at times other than manifestation).
211. Id. at 45-46. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1980):
We do not find persuasive appellants' contention that "bodily injury" means
"compensable bodily injury." The manufacturer here paid for protection from
bodily injury resulting in liability. It should make no difference when the bodily injury
happens to become compensable. Put another way, we see nothing in the policy
which requires that the underlying plaintiff's cause of action accrue within the policy
period. There exists a clear distinction between when bodily injury occurs and when
the bodily injury which has occurred becomes compensable.
Id.
212. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 46-47.
213. Id. at 47.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 47-48 (asbestos related damage is qualitatively different from an encroachment
on real estate or a landslide). See, e.g., Tijsseling v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) (encroachment on real estate), Remmer
v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84 (1956) (landslide).
216. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 48-51. The court found Hancock
unpersuasive because it was "based on such a dearth of authority." Id. at 50. (Hancock cited
only one California case). When considering Clemco Industries v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
665 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the San Francisco Superior Court found that no party
advocated the continuous trigger theory, but rather the court had only the choice of the
manifestation or exposure theory. Id. at 50-51. The superior court wrote that if given such a
limited choice the superior court may also have chosen the exposure theory. Id. The court
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Although the theory that the San Francisco Superior Court em-
ployed is virtually identical to the triple trigger theory as expressed
in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company of North America,28 the San
Francisco Superior Court stated that the reasoning of the court was
different from the reasoning of the court in Keene.219 The superior
court held that the Keene court found the insurance policy language
ambiguous.220 Based on this interpretation of the policy language,
the Keene court devised the triple trigger theory.221 The superior
court, however, found the policy language in issue to be clear and
unambiguous. 222 According to the decision of the superior court, the
language of the policies stated that the insurer agreed to provide
coverage if that insurer had a policy in effect at any time during the
period from exposure to asbestos dust through manifestation of
asbestosis.22 Ambiguity was not a prerequisite to finding the insur-
ance policy was triggered in accord with the triple trigger theory.224
PROPOSAL
When attempting to determine what theory the courts in California
should adopt regarding the trigger of insurer liability in latent disease
situations, the policy considerations underlying contract interpreta-
tion should be applied. Normally, when parties enter into a contract
each party has some understanding as to what is intended by the
contract. Under California law any attempt to interpret a contract
must give effect to the mutual intent of the parties to the contract. 25
If possible, the intent of the parties to the contract should be derived
also found that in Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Group, 747 F. Supp. 1264
(9th Cir. 1984), no party proffered the continous exposure theory. Id. at 49.
217. Id. at 47.
218. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
219. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 51 (decision should not be
misconstrued as one of the progeny of Keene). See also, Levit, supra note 199, at 32 (notes
that court distinguishes Keene as not being based on plain meaning of the policy).
220. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 52.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 21 (intended meaning of the policy language is plain and unambiguous when
examined by itself). All parties agreed that the policy language was unambiguous, but
notwithstanding this agreement, the parties still disagreed as to what trigger was dictated by
this plain language. Id.
223. Id. at 43.
224. See Levit, supra note 199, at 31. The court in the Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases
does not attempt to find ambiguity, as other courts seem to, before applying rules of
construction to the insurance contract. Id.
225. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1636 (vest 1985) ("A contract must be so interpreted as to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as
the same is ascertainable and lawful.").
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solely from the plain meaning of the language found in the contract. 226
Thus, the trigger of insurer liability should be one that will give
effect to the mutual intent of the parties as expressed in the plain
meaning of the policy language.
In order to avoid being held liable to defend or indemnify asbestos
manufacturers, latent injuries can be specifically provided for in
insurance policies to limit or exclude coverage for asbestosis. 227 Nev-
ertheless, as indicated by the existence of the consolidated asbestos
cases, there are a significant number of conflicts involving insurance
policies which use language making no particular provision for as-
bestosis or latent injuries, but rather employ a more generalized
terminology. Both "bodily injury" and "disease" are terms used
in the comprehensive general liability insurance policies discussed
above as triggers of insurer liability.229 During the progression of
asbestosis, a policy is triggered when disease or injury occurs.
To determine when a policy is triggered by bodily injury, a
definition of bodily injury is needed. Bodily injury can be commonly
understood as damage of or concerning the body.23 0 A person exposed
to asbestos dust is injured once the dust avoids the defenses of the
body and is lodged in the lungs. Once in the lungs, a process of
scarring begins. 2 1 This scarring is a bodily injury which, according
to the express language of the policies, triggers coverage. 2 2 Due to
the properties of asbestos this scarring can continue even though no
additional asbestos dust reaches the lungs. 231 This continued scarring
also constitutes damage to the body and thus must also be a trigger
of the insurance policies.
226. See id. § 1639 (West 1985) (intention of parties is to be ascertained from the writing
alone if possible), see id. § 1644 (West 1985) (words of contract are to be understood in their
ordinary and popular sense).
227. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 462, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 203 (1986) (summary judgment granted in favor of insurer affirmed). The court found
that the insurance policy expressly precluded coverage for injury, sickness, disease, or death
arising from exposure to asbestos dust created during use of products manufactured by the
insured. Id. at 470, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
228. See supra note 199 (list of parties involved in the Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases).
229. See supra text accompanying note 55 (insurance policy language).
230. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 22. Using WEBSTER'S THMsD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTnoNARY (1981 ed.), the court found the following definitions. Bodily
is defined as "of or concerning the body." Id. Injury is defined as "hurt, damage, or loss
sustained." Id. Combination of the above terms creates a reasonable definition of bodily
injury as damage of or concerning the body.
231. Id. at 27-29. See supra note 43 (detailed discussion of scarring process).
232. See supra text accompanying note 55 (policy language).
233. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 30.
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Disease is also a trigger of coverage specifically mentioned in the
policy language. 2 4 Disease can be defined as the impairment of the
normal state of the body or any of the components of the body that
modifies performance of a vital function.3 5 At some point, the
scarring of the lungs will accumulate enough to impair the normal
state of the body and detrimentally affect the performance of the
lungs.2 6 The bodily injury can be classified as a disease at that point,
and as such the policy continues to be triggered. Regardless of the
stage of progression of asbestosis, there is either some injury to the
lungs, though the damage may go unnoticed for years, or the presence
of a disease.3 7 Bodily injury and disease are both triggers specifically
mentioned in the policies.2 8 Therefore, the plain language of the
policy indicates that coverage for the insured is triggered continuously
from initial asbestos exposure to manifestation of asbestosis. This is
the triple trigger theory as applied in the Asbestos Insurance Coverage
Cases. 9
Even if less explicit insurance language was the subject of inquiry
in asbestosis litigation, the triple trigger theory could still satisfy the
policies underlying California law. California courts recognize a
policy that ambiguity in insurance contracts should be interpreted to
promote coverage of the insured.240 The triple trigger theory can
consistently provide the greatest number of potentially liable insurers.
Since the triple trigger theory incorporates the triggers of insurance
coverage found in both the exposure and the manifestation theories,
the triple trigger will always provide at least as many potentially
liable insurers as would application of either of the other theories.241
In addition, unlike the exposure or manifestation theories, application
of the triple trigger can impose liability on the insurer for a period
when there is neither exposure to asbestos nor manifestation of
asbestosis. An insurer that had a policy in effect after exposure to
234. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Insurer will pay for liability resulting in
bodily injury; bodily injury is defined so as to include disease. Id.
235. WVBsTm's TIRD NEw INTSRATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 648 (1986).
236. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 29. "Although there is no
universal threshold for when such symptoms will become apparent, it is estimated that at least
100 million of the 300 million alveolar/capillary units in the human body must be affected
for a clinical diagnosis to occur." Id.
237. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 43-45.
238. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
239. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, supra note 8, at 43-45.
240. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 767, 180 Cal. Rptr.
628, 632 (1982).
241. See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text (discussion of triple trigger theory).
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asbestos had already taken place, but terminated coverage before
asbestosis manifested, could be found liable. 242 Since a policy trig-
gering event occurs during the latency period, an insurer cannot avoid
liability by terminating coverage, as is possible under the manifes-
tation theory.2 43 Even if the insurer does terminate coverage, the
policy would already have been triggered and the manufacturer will
have coverage. Thus, the triple trigger theory eliminates the concern
of the courts that coverage would become illusory while resolving
the ambiguity of the policy language against the insurer. 2
4
Finally, the triple trigger theory also eliminates a potential weakness
in the exposure theory. This weakness is found by reference to the
development of the manifestation theory in Eagle-Picher Industries
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.2 45 In the Eagle-Picher case the
manufacturer was not insured during much of the time that exposure
to asbestos was taking place.3 6 Only after extended periods of
exposure to asbestos dust did Eagle-Picher Industries procure any
insurance. The court could find insurance coverage only by employing
the manifestation theory. Had the court employed the exposure
theory, Eagle-Picher Industries would have been responsible for a
pro rata share of the liability.24 7 Since Eagle-Picher had no insurance
for an extended length of time, the pro rata share to be borne by
Eagle-Picher could have been substantial. By using the triple trigger
theory, the court could have found all insurers liable if their policy
was in effect when asbestosis manifested, as did the manifestation
theory employed by the court. Additionally, applying the triple trigger
could also have held liable those insurers with policies in effect during
the latency period.
In overcoming the deficiencies of the manifestation theory and the
exposure theory another facet of the triple trigger theory becomes
evident. A court will not have to create a new theory each time a
different fact pattern arises under which application of the other
theories will not provide adequate coverage. 248 The only circumstances
242. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(exposure in residence triggers insurer liability).
243. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1046.
244. Id.
245. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
246. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1982)
(no insurance prior to 1965).
247. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th
Cir. 1980) (pro rata allocation of liability).
248. See Note, supra note 1, at 77. The triple trigger theory, "assures maximum coverage
regardless of an individual manufacturer's pattern of insurance coverage." Id.
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under which the tripple trigger theory could not provide coverage
would be a situation in which a manufacturer of asbestos never had
an insurance policy that provided coverage for such liability at any
time during or after exposure to asbestos dust.24 9
CONCLUSION
California law requires that insurance policy language be read so
as to give effect to the intentions of the parties to the contract. If
the language is not clear the contract must be interpreted to promote
coverage of the insured. Asbestosis presents the problem of an
extended latency period. The courts all hold that asbestosis should
trigger insurer liability under a comprehensive general liability policy,
but there is disagreement as to when the progression of asbestosis
will trigger coverage. Several theories have been developed to deter-
mine an appropriate trigger. Both the exposure theory and the
manifestation theory examined individually fall short of the require-
ments of California law. Only by triggering insurer liability by
exposure, manifestation, and during the interim latency period, can
the court give full effect to the intent of the parties and promote
coverage of the insured.
Bill S. Edic
249. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
